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BAR BRIEFS
in order to avoid discriminatory results. Undoubtedly this tax, if
applied so as to reach only those solicitors regularly engaged in
carrying on business within the city, would be valid. So applied it
would be free from attack as tending to exclude commerce, and
the possibility of similar impositions by other muncipalities would
not be relevant ;17 the only other danger that would have to be
guarded against would be that of having the measure construed as
an attempt to suppress interstate business under the guise of taxation. Income from sales completed by solicitors who would not
come within the concept of doing business might be reached by
some kind of grass receipts or net income tax. The varying factors
involved in each of the commerce clause cases highlight the difficulty that would face Congress if the Court should accept the
view of some of its members, that only a measure discriminatory
on its face be invalidated and that Congress be given the task of
shaping national policy with respect to other local legislation
affecting interstate commerce. 18 In the light of these considerations the position taken by the Court that it will continue to decide
"single local controversies" probably offers the best solution to
this problem. Aside from its assertion that it will continue to invalidate local taxes that are discriminatory and that it will look
beyond the face of the statute to evaluate the practical consequences of the legislation involved, the striking part of its decision is the fact that the burden of justifying its levy is made to
fall upon the state.19
George Brody, S. Ed.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE
SEIZED UPON ARREST FOR UNRELATED CRIME*-Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation armed with valid warrants
for the arrest of the appellant on charges -of violation of
the Mail Fraud Statute, U. S. C., tit. 18, sec. 338, 18 U. S. C. A.
sec. 338, 7 F. C. A., tit. 18, sec. 338, and of the National Stolen
Property Act, U.S.C., tit. 18, sec. 413-419, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 413419, 7 F. C. A., tit. 18, sec. 413-419, entered the appellant's apartment, made the arrest, and incident thereto made a thorough
search of the premises with the declared purpose of "looking for
two stolen, cancelled checks," and for "any means that might
17 Principal case at 593, note 22. ". . . the difference between municipal and
statewide taxes may not be controlling or even relevant in relation to a tax which
' . . presents neithek the prohibitive consequences inherent in the Richmond's tax
nor any element of discrimination in favor of local business."
18 See dissenting opinions of Justice Black in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S.
434, 59 S. Ct. 325 (1939); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 60 S. C'.
504 (1940).
In the last case he said, "We would, therefore, leave the questions raised
by the Arkansas tax for consideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the
constantly increasing barriers to trade among the States." (Id. at 189.)
Justices
Frankfurter and Douglas concurred.
19 Justice Black dissented without writing an opinion. Justice Douglas wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Murphy concurred.
Realizing that they were
unable to convert the Court to their view that a tax not discriminatory on its face
should be upheld, they contended. "that one who complains that a state tax, though
not discriminatory on its face, discriminates against interstate
commerce in
its
actual operation, should be required to come forward with proof to sustain the
charge." And this has been the position taken by the Court in regard to legislation
other than that involving "civil liberties." Yet when we realize that local activity
-ere impinges upon power delegated to the federal government perhaps it is not to:
exacting for the Court to demand that the taxing agency justify its position.
*This case note first appeared in Volume 30 of the Minnesota Law Review at
page 207, and we are indebted to that publication for permission to reprint it.
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have been used to commit these crimes." During the search, one
of the agents found a sealed envelope marked "George Harris,
personal papers," which contained -blank cards and certificates
used in connection with the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, U. S. C., tit. 50, sec. 301, et. Eeq., 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix,
sec. 301, et seq., 11 F. C. A., tit. 50, appx. 5. The appellant was
indicted and convicted by the federal district court on charges
growing out of his unlawful possession of these cards and certificates. Upon appeal, it was held, that the judgment be affirmed.
The seizure during a reasonable search incident to the lawful
arrest was not unauthorized merely because the things seized had
no connection with the offenses under investigation. .Harris v.
United States, (C. C. A. 10th Cir. 1945) 151F. (2d) 837.
The result reached by the decision in the instant case seems
to militate against the avowed purpose of the courts to liberally
construe the fourth amendment in favor of the individual. See
Weeks v. United States, 1914) 232 U. S. 383, 389-392, 34 S.
Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B 834; Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States (1931) 282 U. S.344, 357, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed.
374. It is supported, however, by the decisions of other courts,
Milan v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th Cir. 1924) 296 Fed. 629, cert.
denied, (1924) 265 U. S. 586, 44 S.Ct. 460, 68 L. Ed. 1192; United
States v. Charles, (N. D. Cal. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 302; contra, United
States v. Boyd, (W. D. Wash. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 1019. A decision by
United States Supreme Court in Gouled v. United States, (1921)
255 U. S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647, would also seem to lend
support to the decision of the instant case; but there the question
posed to the court assumed that the seizure of the articles was
valid, and, as a result, articles specifically named in a search warrant and validly seized could be used to prove any crime against
the accused as to which they constituted relevant evidence.
To
be distinguished is the case of Marron v. United States, (1927)
275 U. S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231, in which the Supreme
Court, although allowing the seizure on another ground, held that
seizure of evidence not described in a search warrant was in violation of the fourth amendment.
Furthermore, it has been held
that the authority to search as an incident to arrest is no greater
than that granted by a search warrant properly issued, the arrest
merely taking the place of the search warrant. United States v.
Lefkowitz, (1932) 285 U. S.452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877, 82
A. L. R. 775; Papani v. United States, (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84
F. (2d) 160; United States v. Thomson, (C. C. A. 7th Cir. 1940)
113 F. (2d) 643, 129 A. L. R. 1291.
By analogy, if excessive
seizures are prohibited in the case where a search warrant has
been obtained, they should also be prohibited in the case where a
lawful arrest takes the place of a search warrant. It would seem
that prohibition of the use of such evidence is the better View in
the light of the announced policy of the courts to liberally construe
the fourth amendment.
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